Re: [apsa_itp] a quiet revolution in democracy

["David Bray" <David_Bray@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Michael - you may also want to search for Group Decision Support Systems
(GDSS) as the information systems field in the 1980's researched
text-based democratizing systems similar in several ways to what you
outline below. Further, while I'd like whole-heartedly to see improvements
with democracies, Peter's comments are quite true and represent large
obstacles to the proposal: 

>People aren't political. 

Flaws include the fact that the e-democracy probably will have
companies/lobbyists doing pyramid schemes to "buy" people's votes, just
automated through the Internet. "Click here to earn 700 Linden dollars a
day to spend in Second Life" ($2 USD)... or "Free access to mp3's or
hi-res video if you align yourself with the XYZ party!" Instead of being
an e-democracy, it will become more of an "e-market" where voters will be
courted (duped?) like consumers in exchange for their votes. 

Second, where will people get the time to wade through all these bills?
Automated programs ('bots') would probably emerge to do edits as proxies
for people/corporations/lobbying groups. No one will have enough time to
read all the laws that are proposed, so while you propose that people
could "defer" to the judgement of others -- how will you explicitly set
these controls (would you have to do it for each bill, again time
constraints). Also, such deference no longer remains a democracy, but a
sort of networked system of vassals pledging to their lords, almost like
democracy remixed with feudalism. 

Third, an e-democracy would have profound information security
ramifications, how do you (1) know the person voting really is that
person, and (2) that the person's account hasn't been hijacked or
zombified? These same security problems confront VISA, Mastercard, and
corporate banks and have not been resolved. You could issue digital
certificates to everyone, but in practice that's a huge headache; still
probably would have 'phishing' for votes. 

>People are twisted. 

An e-democracy assumes that giving more decision-making power to the
masses is a good things. But I'm not sure this tenet has been proven as
humans, in large groups, can do some fairly nasty or violent actions. Who
will prevent a majority from abusing (or enslaving) a minority? Recall the
Stanford Prison Experiment and the tragic results observed there? If you
can obtain IRB approval, you may want to run an actual field study to test
your ideas of an e-democracy, to see if human beings behave as rationally
as an e-democracy would require. This could contrast theory with observed
behaviors. 

On a more basic level, will everyone vote only for their own local
interests, and thus the good of the 'nation' is lost as laws and bills
that only benefit largely populated area passed? With any democracy --
electronic or no -- will enough people vote for the good of the state,
even when this may not align with their own immediate self-interests?
(Does this even happen now?)

... one last thought on wikis-like activities: Wikipedia 'shows biased
page edits' http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/6947532.stm

Michael Allan <mike@xxxxxxxxx>,Internet on Thursday, August 16, 2007 at
1:38 AM -0500 wrote:
>This is a challenge, to find a flaw in the reasoning that supports
>the assertion, "A quiet revolution in democracy is unfolding."
>
>Summary of the reasoning:
>
>  A. Detailed plans exist to re-found government on the direct
>     authority of the public, expressing its will through social
>     and collaborative media.
>
>  B. Each step in implementing these plans depends on the
>     initiative of ordinary citizens, volunteering their time
>     and working together.
>
>  C. No power within a liberal democracy would oppose any step.
>
>A. Plans
>--------
>
>The main branches of government are covered: legislative, executive
>and judiciary.  For the legislative, one plan is to base it on
>community law-making:
>
>  1. Any citizen could draft a proposal (bill) for a new law;
>     or the amendment or abrogation of an existing law.
>
>  2. Other citizens (drafters) could copy the bill, modify it,
>     and thus create their own variants (drafts) of it.
>
>  3. Each citizen would have a single vote per bill,
>     which he might use to 'back' any draft of the bill.
>     A drafter could thus aquire a 'constituency' of backers.
>
>  ... and so on
>
>  http://zelea.com/project/textbender/d/overview.xht#Law-Making
>
>For the executive and judiciary, one plan is an electoral system based
>on a delegate cascade:
>
>  1. Each citizen would carry a single vote per office, which he could
>     use to 'back' any other citizen as a candidate for that office.
>     He could also withdraw his backing at any time, or transfer it
>     to another candidate.
>
>  2. A candidate's own vote (as a citizen) would carry with it
>     the votes of all her backers.
>
>  3. At the start of the next term, the candidate with the most
>     backing would automatically enter office.
>
>In this way, the public would choose its own candidates, and elect
>them directly to office.  A social medium such as 'Smartocracy' could
>be used for this purpose.
>http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/HICSS.2007.484
>
>The delegate cascade (2) would support a 'pyramidal meritocracy'.
>Most of us (to explain) are not really qualified to choose among
>candidates for all the various public offices. But we probably know
>somebody *more* qualified than we are, for each of them.  ("I don't
>know who should be Public Health Officer, but my friend is a nurse, so
>I'm backing her. She can decide.")  Voter competence would thus be
>reached within a few degrees of separation: each higher candidate
>being more fit for that office; more worthy of public trust; and also
>more worthy of the added electoral weight she carries.  And so this
>'pyramid' would ensure that high public offices were held by the most
>competent and trusted citizens.
>
>B. Initiative
>-------------
>
>Each step in implementing these plans depends on the initiative of
>ordinary citizens, volunteering their time and working together.  The
>underlying social and collaborative networks can be built on free and
>open technology. No private interest or government program would be
>needed to develop them.  We could depend entirely on the public spirit
>of engineers, like those volunteers who built free Unix, and much of
>the Web.
>
>Socially, too, the intiative can come from the grassroots.  And it can
>come quickly.  Here is a scenario:
>
>  1. A simple voting system based on a delegate cascade is developed.
>
>  2. People begin to use it. They cast 'pretend' votes and elevate
>     their own 'pretend' candidates for the next election.
>
>  3. A newspaper runs a story: "Public Electing Its Own Candidates!"
>
>  4. The participation level rises, approaching that of an election.
>
>  5. The news media begin to interview the top candidates.
>
>What would prevent the top candidates from running in the next
>election? And who would dare to run against them?
>
>This scenario might become the reality within a few years. The
>technology for such a voting system is not terribly difficult. It
>might still be imperfect in 3 years time, but it would not need to be
>perfect in order to be decisive in an election.  For some public
>offices, perhaps some very high ones, the most recent election may be
>the last in which people are told, in advance, who they can vote for.
>
>The legislative branch is not so easy to change. It could not be done
>so quickly.  The technology is more difficult, and any shift of
>legislative responsibility would have to be gradual and cautious, to
>avoid confusion.
>
>However, in places that did not already have a legislature, the
>institution of community law-making might come more quickly.  One
>place that lacks a legislature (lacks accountable government, period)
>is the world.
>
>C. Opposition
>-------------
>
>No power within a liberal democracy would oppose any step in the
>implementation of these plans. A liberal democracy cannot easily
>resist its public.  Its whole bent is to serve the public will.  There
>is one high institution -- supreme judiciary -- that has the power of
>sustained opposition. But there is no reason to suspect, in this case,
>that the justices would use that power.
>
>Nor could any state (democratic or otherwise) do anything to prevent
>the founding of an international world government.  After all, the
>authority of that government would not derive from any nation state;
>it would not be a 'United Nations'.  Its authority would come directly
>from a worldwide polity -- from us.  And we are, all of us, tired of
>nations that do not get along with each other.
>
>(Is there a flaw in this reasoning?)
>
>-- 
>Michael Allan
>
>http://zelea.com/
>
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