[apsa_itp] open electoral system (strawman plan)

[Steffen W Schmidt <sws@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

In US elections voters live in a series of krazy and overlapping
jurisdictions and are entitled only
to vote for positions or ballot measures (initiatives etc) within these
jurisdiction. 

For example, I cannot vote for School Board members in the
community next to mine but I vote for the same list of candidates for
US Congress (I am in the same Congressional district as they are),
but I can vote in my Township Board
election (but it is a tiny district so only a few of us living in
this area can vote for that board) and I can vote for the State House
District but my neighbor just across the street cannot because the
State House District line cuts about 10 yards from my house. I can vote
for County Board of Supervisors but my
neighbor in the other direction lives in a different county and cannot
vote for the same board - or for the County
Extension, 4-H boards, etc.  And, everyone in the entire
state of Iowa votes for president. You can imagine that geocentric and
"neighbor credentialization"  of me as a legitimate voter
for any given position that's on the ballot is impossible.

Then there is the question of whether my neighbors can give me trust
links because I am Hispanic and for about 25 years was
not a US citizen and therefore not
eligible to vote. Now I am but how do I "validate" my
residency with my neighbors who have known me for many years (as a
non-citizen). Do I have to show them my certificate of naturalization! My
son is living with us for the summer but he is registered in
Massachusetts but my neighbors have known him for several decades - how
do they devalidate him as a voter in my district and state?


> Hello all,
>
> I have a strawman design sketch for an 'open electoral system', and
> I
> wonder if it can stand up to scrutiny?  In particular, I make
> some
> assumptions about community participation.
>
> The plan is to develop it now, and deploy it as a test-bed in the
> community, operating as an advanced poll on official elections.
> (Details are still rough, and this was written in haste, please
> pardon
> oversights.)
>
> I am posting separately to APSA_ITP (social and computer
> scientists),
> and to TorCamp (developers/engineers):
> http://lists.hmdc.harvard.edu/lists/apsa_itp_at_lists_hmdc_harvard_edu/2007_08/threads.html
> http://groups.google.com/group/torcamp
>
> Open Voter Registry
> -------------------
>
> Design-wise, the #1 problem is enforcement of a single vote (to
> prevent ballot stuffing, etc.).  The solution proposed here is
> similar
> to a traditional, enumerated registry: it's an address-by-address
> database of neighbourhood voters. Its difference is, instead of
> being
> validated by a periodic survey, it would be validated by a
> continuous
> web of trust.
>
> Structurally, each entry in the voter registry has:
>
>   * land address
>   * name
>   * e-mail address
>
> A web of trust then interlinks and validates the entries.  Each
> link
> (trust-link) is directed from one entry, corresponding to a
> registered
> voter, to another entry. To become eligible, a voter must aquire a
> threshold of trust (say 3 trust-links).
>
> There are also mistrust-links. Each mistrust-link cancels a
> trust-link.  Voters will use mistrust-links to "point the
> finger" at
> dubius registrants in their neighbourhood, such as houses with too
> many occupants, or non-existent addresses.
>
> Functionally, the registry accepts commands directly from citizens.
> Citizens send in their intial registration, and maintain their
> trust-links, by email (verified by challenge/response; later, a Web
> interface too).
>
> The full registry will be shown on the Web, complete with all trust
> links, etc. It will be especially easy for a voter to browse through
> her own neighbourhood, and adjacent neighbourhoods.
>
> Neighbourhood Registrars
> ------------------------
>
> These will be unofficial volunteers, living in the community, who
> are
> especially active in assisting their neighbours with the
> registration
> process, and with policing the web of trust.
>
> For registration, the registrar might visit other people in the
> neighbourhood to explain the purpose of the open electoral system.
> If
> they give permission, the registrar could then proceed to register
> them, and grant them an initial trust-link. (People could
> self-register too. They would begin with zero trust-links.)
>
> The registrar could then send each new registrant an email,
> explaining
> how to cross-link with their near neighbours, and thus bring an
> entire
> neighbourhood into eligibility.
>
> The registrar would be especially active in policing the resulting
> web
> of trust, in her own neighbourhood. She would often be the first to
> point down abusers of the system. In all of this, she would set an
> example for others in her neighbourhood.
>
> Voting System
> -------------
>
> Once a voter is registered, she can begin voting for all government
> offices in her jurisdiction. End-candidates need not be registered,
> but must register in order to cast their own votes (and thus channel
> the cascade to higher candidates). All candidates will be chosen by
> the voters, simply by the fact of voting for them. (There are no
> 'nominees', all citizens are eligible candidates.)
>
> Votes (and vote shifts) are sent in directly from citizens by email
> (later, Web too).  The current state of each elections will be
> visible
> on the Web, complete with the delegate heirarchy. Voters will thus
> know where their votes cascade to. (This is a 'delegate cascade'
> system, as we discussed earlier in APSA_ITP. People vote 'close to
> home', based on their own knowledge, and on information they
> trust.)
>
> A single voting system is used for all levels of
> government. Candidates are identified by email address. (The same
> voting system might be used for other purposes too, such as ad hoc
> polls. More important, it will later be used to vote for draft bills
> in community legislatures.)
>
> Problems
> --------
>
> Vote buying: Can a law against that be enforced, or not? If not, we
> need to hide all or part of the cascade from the public (so illegal
> buyers cannot easily verify the voting behaviour of their
> purchases).
> But that solution would introduce problems of its own (complexity,
> policing the hidden parts against fraud, all the problems of secret
> ballots in traditional voting).
>
> Some people will not want their addresses posted on the Web (web of
> trust or no).  However, back when people were listed in the phone
> book
> -- address and all -- most people accepted *that*. And this is a
> community intiative (not top down) so people may be more receptive
> to
> it. And, if it makes neighbours more aware of each other, would that
> not make the community safer? So, hopefully, not too many will opt
> out.
>
> Jurisdictional scale: Is it a single national system?  Or
> multiple
> regional systems that cross-talk to calculate the cascade? 
> Cross-talk
> complicates things. (But consider, international elections and polls
> etc. would necessarily require it, anyway.)
>
> Disenfranchisement of voters lacking computer/network access: Maybe
> the community needs to come up with ideas. Since delegation is built
> into the system, it should not be too hard to use it, at least as a
> temporary stop-gap; e.g. sneaker-net between voter and trusted
> delegate in the neighbourhood.
>
> Over-representation of residents ineligible to vote in the official
> election, e.g. non-citizens. In some types of community, this might
> significantly skew the 'poll'.
>
> Summary
> -------
>
> My main concern is on the social side: Am I assuming too much of the
> public community here?  Especially in the registration process,
> will
> they pull together and participate? (I can't forsee why not. We
> could
> assume political leadership.  But I have been cautioned against
> assuming too much of a community, especially in new tasks.)
>
> On the technical side, we could develop and deploy this system
> fairly
> quickly:
>   * email challenge/response (easy with TMDA)
>   * database (any)
>   * a Web view of the registy/elections (bulk of the work is in
> here,
>      but nothing fancy is needed, at first)
>   * glue, to hold everything together.
>
> Maybe we could be ready for registration, in a single riding, in 4
> months? (I assume it would be a community development effort.
> TorCampers, can I assume leadership/organization from TorCamp,
> do you think?)
>
> The significance is, the unofficial system could have a decisive
> effect on official elections.  When fully deployed, it would offer
> a
> continous, around the clock, 'poll' -- showing top candidates, and
> likely winner -- well in advance of the next, official election.
> Come
> the election, if the unofficial candidates ran, they would start
> with
> full public backing. If the top candidate held onto it, she would
> likely win.
>
> -- 
> Michael Allan
>
> http://zelea.com/
>
> --
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Steffen W. Schmidt, Ph.D.
University Professor of Political Science - Iowa State University, sws@xxxxxxxxxxx
Affiliate, Nova University Oceanographic Center, sschmidt@xxxxxxxx
Associate, Latin American Institute, U. of Wisconsin
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